

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**COUNTERDRUGS:
A MATTER OF BALANCE**

BY

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COUNTERDRUGS: A MATTER OF BALANCE

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ABSTRACT

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The U.S. military has been engaged in the war against drugs for some 17 years. Despite all the resources thus far expended, the U.S. still finds itself firmly in the grip of this unyielding enemy. While the U.S. military is not the lead agency in this endeavor, the military has the resources required to significantly reduce illicit drug flow. Unfortunately, the 50-plus U.S. agencies committed to this struggle have not been able to stem the flow of illicit drugs. Fundamental problems exist in understanding and accommodating the challenges faced by our allies in Latin America. Legal restrictions are over stated. Disunity of interagency efforts plagues the endeavor. Funding for counterdrug and security assistance has been reduced despite ample evidence that the war is far from over. The requisite balances between Ends, Ways, and Means have not been carefully explored. The results therefore have been predictable . . . disconsolate failure.

COUNTERDRUGS: A MATTER OF BALANCE

INTRODUCTION:

At present, the United States finds itself embroiled in a war that is seemingly endless. The war on drugs is targeted at eliminating what many consider a devouring cancer in our democratic society. Illicit drugs are a scourge that consumes our nation's economy, its social development, cuts across and affects all racial, ethnic, and economic stations. Unfortunately, much like the current struggle against AIDS, much is known about the disease's symptoms and devastating effects, but little is known about an effective cure.

The U.S. military, along with a host of other federal agencies have been tasked to wage war against drugs. The U.S. military, has been actively engaged in this task for some 17 years. Sadly, after the expenditure of much time, effort, and resources, the light at the end of this twisting tunnel is not yet within sight. The reasons for the persistency of the drug problems in the U.S. are varied, complex, and despite all studies, enigmatic.

This work will: (1). Review current U.S. drug policy. (2). Analyze the stated interagency strategy to combat drug flow into the U.S.. (3). Briefly review the damage that drug use has done to the nation in terms of economic losses. (4). Trace the military's role and involvement over the past 17 years. (5). Explore the challenges that must be overcome, foremost of which is an apparent lapse in accurately analyzing host nation capabilities and limitations. To remedy these identified weaknesses I will propose courses of action based on a

strategy that includes closer cooperation between all agencies engaged in this struggle. They will also address the requirement for a rededicated effort to more fully understand and accommodate the challenges, limitations, and needs of our allies. Lastly, they will call for a concerted effort to harness all security assistance programs thereby synchronizing the total effort and empowering U.S. allies to take on a greater and more effective role.

TRACING THE NATIONAL STRATEGY:

Following established policy, the military's counterdrug strategy is based on the administration's National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS is the overarching document that binds 50-plus federal agencies that are currently committed to the war on drugs. This document delineates goals for reducing both the demand and the supply of illicit drugs.

The U.S. has shifted its strategy from the past emphasis on transit interdiction to a more evenly balanced effort with source countries to build institutions, destroy trafficking organizations and stop supplies . . . ¹

In turn, the National Military Strategy (NMS) document addresses the counterdrug issue under the "Peacetime Engagement" banner.

The Armed Forces, working in close cooperation with law enforcement agencies, will use all means authorized by the President and the Congress to halt the flow of illegal drugs into this country . . . ²

The U.S. government's focus on counterdrugs is not a fad. In 1986, President Reagan, recognizing the destabilizing effects to the nation, elevated the nation's resolution by signing a "National Security Directive, designating the international drug trade as a national security issue."³ President Bush expanded

the offensive and declared war on drugs. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed in 1989, and the first National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) was published in 1989.⁴ The current NDCS, more so than the NSS, delineates the military's role in support of the counterdrug strategy. In summary:

the key is to support the law enforcement agencies that have counterdrug responsibilities . . . increase the effectiveness of source nations in reducing the supply and export . . . assist in countering the flow . . . both outside the U.S. and at the nation's border . . . conduct counter trafficking in the U.S. by support for Federal, State, and local law enforcement . . . enhance the effectiveness of foreign governments, agencies, and forces in reducing the effectiveness and influence of the drug cartels; and reduce the demand for illegal drugs within DoD and its surrounding communities.⁵

COST TO THE NATION:

Parenthetically, the damage to the U.S. economy in estimated production loss due to illicit drug sales ranges from \$100-\$150 billion.⁶ Incidentally, the figures while substantial, may be underestimated. In a recent report, it was estimated that annually, some \$500 billion, from illicit drug sales make its way back to Latin American (LATAM) banks for laundering.⁷ Furthermore, the estimated direct losses to businesses exceed \$75 billion, due to increased health care costs, workmen's compensation increases, employee absenteeism, and thefts to firms annually.⁸

INVESTMENT AND RETURN:

To execute the herculean mission, the government's counterdrug budget for FY95 was \$12.7 billion. The Department of Defense (DoD) received \$852.0 million. For FY96 the administration requested \$14.6 billion; however the DoD portion of that request

was pared to \$812 million.⁹ In FY95 U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), who oversees a prime areas of origin and exportation of illicit drugs into the U.S., received \$153 million specifically earmarked for the counterdrug campaign.

It is apparent that all the resources thus far expended on the drug war have not achieved intended ends. Gen. Barry R.

McCaffrey, CINCSOUTHCOM, observed that:

We face a dilemma in our counterdrug efforts. Our efforts over the past five or more years have not yielded the effect we desired. Coca growing has not diminished. The amount of cocaine produced and subsequently smuggled out to the United States and world markets has also remained steady. Both the street price and the availability of cocaine in the United States have not been demonstrably affected by the extensive U.S. interagency involvement . . . ¹⁰

Gen. McCaffrey's observations are disheartening. The dismal results of U.S. efforts are further confirmed by the information gathered during a recent visit with the Drug Enforcement Administration (New York City Office). The hosting agent said that "the price of cocaine was at an all time low, while purity was at its highest." Also of concern is the revelation that LATAM is now producing high quality heroin. In addition, the drug cartels have established a sophisticated distribution network that circumvents the successful interdiction efforts within the Caribbean Basin. The current trend suggests that drug trafficking activities through Mexico have dramatically increased. It is estimated that 70% to 80% of all illicit drug flow from LATAM into the U.S. is now being funneled through Mexico. Illicit drugs are reaching Mexico in large bulk. From there, the shipments are broken down into smaller lots, and are

then transported into the U.S. by a large number of carriers. According to the DEA agent, these new strategies are intended to thwart U.S. interdiction efforts by flooding the borders with carriers. This approach reduces significant losses to the drug traffickers if a shipment is intercepted.¹¹ This vividly illustrates the detailed level of organization, efficiency, and flexibility possessed by the drug trafficking enterprises. Sadly, despite the clear evidence that drug trafficking into the U.S. has not subsided, and that drug traffickers are circumventing interdiction efforts, the U.S. military's budget has been severely reduced.

TRACING DoD INVOLVEMENT:

The U.S. military is only one of some 50-odd agencies involved in combating drug traffic into the U.S.. Moreover, the military is not the lead agency in this monumental effort. The prime responsibility for the execution of this massive effort falls to the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and U.S. Customs. The U.S. military's role is primarily "Source Nation Support, and Detecting and Monitoring Transport of Illegal Drugs." Briefly this entails providing support in the three prime cocaine source countries (Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia). The military's support seeks to develop allied proficiency, the "end game," is enhancing capabilities for apprehension, arrest, and seizures. A very important facet in this effort is the military's role as providers of training to our allies. In addition, DoD provides assets that detect, and monitor illicit

drug flow into the U.S., handing off targets to appropriate law enforcement agencies.¹²

DoD has been actively involved in this conflict for some 17 years. A brief recap of DoD's previous drug control efforts date back to 1979-1980, "Operation Green Sea,". A host of other operations followed and in 1987, the U.S. military acting in a supporting role, teamed up with DEA for "Operation Blast Furnace." Since then interagency operations have been routinely conducted. Unfortunately, all efforts have resulted in disconsolate failure in terms of significantly stemming drug flow into the U.S.. Today the quantity of illicit drugs originating in LATAM and sold on American streets has not diminished. Prices have remained stable and recent reports indicate that once again illicit drug use by our youth is on the increase.

DoD's ARSENAL:

The military's role in the war against drugs is primarily as a supporting player. However, the military provides for a substantial share of the total effort. It possesses and employs the required equipment, skills, experience, and expertise to conduct most of the necessary mission essential functions, save direct law enforcement. For example, the required vehicles, platforms, hardware, and expertise to conduct interdiction operations reside mainly within the military. The military's Special Operations Community has the linguists, trained civil affairs cadre, psychological operations cadre, counter terrorist and counter insurgency unit training cadre. These assets

routinely provide the subject matter expertise, advice, and on site training needed to better enable our LATAM neighbors to deal with the narcotrafficking dilemma.¹³ The U.S. Army's Helicopter School Battalion, at Ft Rucker Al., trains the preponderance of Colombian, Bolivian, Peruvian, and Mexican national police pilots, aviation maintainers, and logisticians. The School of the Americas at Ft Benning Ga., offers a variety of programs of instruction, training military, national police, and other government agency students from all of the LATAM countries. In addition, the Air Force's Inter American Air Forces Academy, and the Navy's Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School, offer courses that facilitate the development of host nation competence and expertise.

It is important to note that DoD is not the only agency that provides training to LATAM countries. The DEA, U.S. Customs, and a host of others actively participate providing valuable training to our LATAM allies. However, these U.S. agencies very frequently turn to DoD to provide required training for both their own organic assets, and allied nation needs. These assets form the nucleus of a formidable empowering tool, which can enhance LATAM countries' abilities and capabilities to remedy their internal challenges, thus contributing greatly to the U.S. imperative of stemming illicit drug flow. Sadly, these important assets are all under-funded and therefore cannot realize the full measure of their potential benefits.

MILITARY VICE LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING:

It can be argued that the training provided by the U.S. military is not in traditional law enforcement methods. However, it is important to understand that the realities in most LATAM countries dictate that both the military forces, and the national police units must possess military skills to achieve and execute the more traditional law enforcement tasks. Incidentally, all LATAM countries field national police forces. These units by most standards are paramilitary forces, and are organized much like military organizations. The counterdrug operations conducted in most LATAM host nations may be associated with conventional law enforcement objectives; however, in execution they more often closely parallel counter insurgency campaigns. This is in response to the overwhelming firepower that the drug cartels can afford to purchase, field, and mass against military or national police units. Furthermore, well-organized and equipped insurgency groups are often intertwined in drug trafficking. Compelling evidence exists to prove that drug cartels maintain symbiotic relationships with organized insurgency groups. The cartels' nexus to the insurgency groups is the substantial financial contributions made to these organizations. The drug cartels are not thought to embrace the political ideals of the insurgency groups; however, the marriage provides each mutual benefits. For example, a drug cartel might charter an armed insurgent force who then attacks, weakens, and distracts the government's efforts. Thus, the cartel gains a measure of freedom to prosecute their criminal activities. The

insurgents in turn, gain much needed funds to prosecute their fight against the government.¹⁴ To illustrate the point, the police barracks in the District of Urau, Colombia, were recently attacked by rebels. The barracks were severely damaged, several policemen were killed, while the rebels made off with an undisclosed number of weapons and ammunition. The attackers, were reported to have been leftist rebels, who are supported by monies from one of the drug cartels based in Medellin, Colombia.¹⁵ In Peru a similar symbiotic arrangement exists by which the Sendero Luminoso, taxes drug trafficking endeavors to finance their insurgency movement. In this hostile and highly volatile environment traditional law enforcement action often develops into military counterinsurgency operations and vice versa. In addition, due to the lack of infrastructure, poor lines of communications, and vast stretches of isolated terrain, national law enforcement units must be empowered with military capacity, equipment, and skills.

PRIME MOTIVE:

The reasons for the inability of U.S. efforts to bring the drug problem under control are varied and enigmatic. The prime motivator for drug trafficking is the monumental profits. The U.S. is recognized as the world's leader in illicit drug use, consuming an estimated 60% of the world's illicit drug output.¹⁶ Until the U.S. population is made to and/or decides to abstain from consuming illegal drugs, the problem will continue. The phenomenal profit is clearly the prime motivator; however, there

are a host of other factors that have contributed to the discouraging attempts at stemming the abundant flow of narcotics into the U.S..

SHORT SIGHTED VISION:

The overarching U.S. strategy has been narrow in vision and has not fully embraced the concerns and challenges of our LATAM partners. Briefly, the U.S. strategy in LATAM has been to stem the flow of drugs by primarily attacking it at the source. This has expanded to targeting the drug cartels' leadership, infrastructure, and command and control. This is accomplished by the host nation, by destroying the crops, the processing sites, and interdicting shipments. Furthermore, U.S. assistance is provided by gathering and sharing intelligence on the cartels' criminal activities with host nation agencies. However, the campaign plans have overlooked some critical facets . . . fully comprehending host nation problems, and securing a realistic and a proportionate measure of host nation support and cooperation. U.S. policy seeks to encourage our southern neighbors to fully commit all available resources to combat the flow of drugs to our shores. However, the policy overlooks the stark realities that exist in the prime exporting countries. While dramatic changes have taken place in LATAM, there still remain significant challenges. Democracy has taken root in the region; however, the foothold is tenuous as two governments have thus far trifled with, and temporarily suspended constitutional government (Peru and Guatemala). Two countries are still plagued by tenacious

insurgencies (Peru and Colombia). Bitter border disputes that threaten stability are still present (Peru and Ecuador). Criminal activities and lawlessness are widespread and often overtax the governments' marginal capabilities to combat them in Peru, Colombia and Mexico. While the region's economies are improving, poverty and mal-distribution of wealth are prevalent. Current modest increases in GDP are being outstripped by population growth. In LATAM, an estimated 189 million people are living in poverty. Half of these, have incomes less than that required to maintain a minimally adequate daily diet.¹⁷

During operations "Desert Shield and Desert Storm," the U.S. received kudos for its role in forging a cohesive and effective coalition. This successful alliance made possible the attainment of the mission's limited goals. Key to the coalition's effectiveness was a detailed understanding of each members' political position, culture, capabilities, limitations, national goals, and desired end state. Unfortunately, the same meticulous crafting has not been fully prosecuted in LATAM. This is truly inauspicious, given that detailed knowledge, experience, and expertise of this troubled region are abundant amongst the U.S. military, and the other U.S. agencies engaged in the war against narcotrafficking.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION:

The U.S. has failed to fully appreciate the depth of the difficulties faced by our LATAM allies. In addition, there are also significant internal problems that have contributed to the

counterdrug debacle. Gen. Thurman, while CINCSOUTH, observed "if you look at the DEA, they have 'snowcap' people who don't even report to the DEA guy in-country . . . So there are several DEAs, as well as FBIs and Custom overseers."¹⁸ Gen Thurman made these observation many years ago. It seems logical that after much trial and error, these problems would no longer plague the U.S. efforts. Yet recently, a strategic assessment noted that:

One issue is interagency coordination. The scope and quality of agency teamwork has steadily improved at the embassy and Washington levels. However, there remains many cases of uncoordinated and scattershot efforts. It is difficult to integrate country-and agency-specific strategies, plans, and resources into a single campaign with achievable objectives.¹⁹

Without interagency coordination and cooperation this war will continue to go badly for the U.S.. The importance of interagency synergy is a given for any endeavor of this nature. However, for the war on drugs it is of mega-magnitude, given its complexity and sensitive temperament. Failures due to interagency disharmony, aside from failing to secure objectives, have contributed to the erosion of LATAM governments' confidence in U.S. policy and strategy.

LEGAL CONCERNS:

Another stumbling block, real or imagined, has been the legal implications of U.S. military involvement in the war on drugs. Two laws are often cited as challenges for the military's involvement in the counterdrug efforts. The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) and the Economy Act (31 USC 1535). Generally, the Posse Comitatus Act, forbids the military from enforcing civil laws. The Act prohibits "direct participation," by members of

the Armed Forces, "in a search and seizure, an arrest, or other similar activity . . .," while assisting civil law enforcement agencies. These restrictions do not apply to the U.S. Coast Guard, nor to the National Guard when they are performing duties in the U.S. not under Federal control. The Act does allow the military to lend a host of support to U.S. law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, in 1993, the Attorney General ruled that the restrictions of Posse Comitatus do not apply outside U.S. territory. This broad statement has since been better defined, but still clearly allows the military more flexibility while conducting counterdrug operations outside U.S. borders. The Economy Act, merely requires civil law enforcement agencies to reimburse DoD for the support it provides. However, this restriction while still on the books, is largely inconsequential given the military's directed role contained in the National Drug Interdiction Improvement Act of 1986, and existing Presidential and DoD directives. While some see these laws as restrictive, they are appropriate and do allow the latitude required by the U.S. military to execute its mission. Senior leaders while acknowledging the restrictions, did not rule out the critical role the military must and, more importantly, can perform. Secretary of Defense Cheney said that:

"We also need to make clear that the Defense Department is not a law enforcement agency. We do not enforce domestic criminal laws, nor can we solve societies demand problems. But, there is much that we can do without usurping the police role.²⁰

While some still cite Posse Comitatus as restrictive and

therefore requiring modification, an important factor is overlooked. Even if more latitude was provided to the U.S. military to execute traditional law enforcement activities abroad, this would be viewed by allied nations as an infringement to their sovereignty. More importantly, this would counter all U.S. efforts thus far expended in mentoring the LATAM militaries as to their appropriate, and subordinate role within a civilian led, democratically elected government. This is important because LATAM militaries, have in the past, been used to excess in enforcing civil law. In fact, most LATAM countries have embraced the tenets represented in our Posse Comitatus Act.

EMPOWERING ALLIES:

It is appropriate to note that while my focus has been on counterdrug efforts, within the NMS, the "Peacetime Engagement" ensign contains other foundational programs for "Promoting Stability Through Regional Cooperation and Constructive Interaction." Among these are the critically important nation assistance, security assistance, and military to military contacts programs. Prosecution of the war on drugs must integrate these programs using them as vehicles to secure counterdrug objectives. These programs, if well coordinated and executed will assist LATAM governments, their militaries, and police forces to better deal with sovereign issues that fully impact on the narcotrafficking dilemma.

The Defense Ministerial Conference in Williamsburg Va., concluded that the overarching U.S. objective was consolidation

of democracy in LATAM. Among the many resolutions are components that facilitate obtainment of this objective; i.e. Close communication among military personnel; academic exchanges and joint exercises; peaceful settlement of disputes; subordination of the armed forces to political powers, and modernizing the armed forces to support governments.²¹ However, one of the main impediments to democracy in LATAM is the narcotics industry.

Its most destructive effects is the way it undermines a democratic society's core institution-the legislative branch, the judiciary system, the forces of law and order, and the political parties-which in turn erodes a society's hope justice.²²

The empowering programs cited above are vehicles that, if properly used, can assist LATAM countries in achieving these goals. Ultimately, if our LATAM allies can achieve these goals, the U.S. will also benefit . . . this is the classical "win-win" scenario.

Sadly, the continuing drawbacks and funding cuts have seriously hampered U.S. efforts in these important programs. For LATAM, security assistance programs have seen sharp declines. In FY 1990, International Military Education and Training, Economic Support Fund, and Foreign Military Financing for all of LATAM and Mexico were \$1,365.8 million, by FY 1995, the figure had dropped to \$49.3 million, and predicted to go lower.²³ Arguably, the initial funding cuts were justified due to the resolution of ongoing conflicts within the region. For example the war in El Salvador ended; nevertheless, subsequent funding cuts have been severe and have adversely impacted on the continuing counterdrug

war. In addition, International Narcotic Matters (INM), training funds that are primarily for training police forces, but can in special cases also be used to train military forces have also been severely reduced. Recently, the Administration requested \$250 million for INM; however, Congress cut this figure and only funded \$115 million.²⁴ These misguided reductions, are in part, a result of the U.S. effort to curb government spending. And perhaps to satisfy the demand of the U.S. public to invest more on domestic programs and less on foreign aid. Whatever the reason, these reductions are of great consequence to the U.S., when coupled with the fact that LATAM cannot afford and therefore historically spends less, on their militaries than any other region of the world (less than 1% of GNP in 1994).²⁵

Given the current political and economic realities in the U.S., it would be fruitless to suggest that full restoration of funding for these programs should be considered. However, it would be of tremendous help if funding were to be restored to a reasonable level. An in-depth analysis is required to determine the appropriate level of funding. However, based on my observation of the assistance provided during FY 93, restoration to this funding level is more in line with current needs. This would allow these programs to regain a measure of credibility, and achieve results. To illustrate the point, in FY 1994, the requirement to train Colombian pilots to fly with night vision goggles was identified. This was prompted by the realization that drug traffickers were conducting a significant portion of

their operations under the cover of darkness. The costs of training these crews to a level comparable with U.S. Army Aviation standards were compiled. However, due to the existing funding constraints, the training program had to be severely pared. Despite the best advice by subject matter experts, the reduced training which was eventually provided, only managed to train crews to a level later deemed as inadequate and dangerous. In the end, the training did not produce the desired results, and the Colombian crews appropriately did not fly these demanding missions. Had appropriate levels of funding been made available, the program would have enhanced our allies' capability. As it stands, not only did this program fail, but precious funds were squandered on an endeavor that was predicted to fail from the start.

Perhaps one of the most contemptuous issues in justifying investment in these assistance programs is the often heard but nevertheless, overstated notion that our allies are not doing enough on their own to solve their problems. Charges that Colombia has tired of the anti-drug effort are met by cries of dismay from Colombians, who point to the thousands of lives they have lost in this struggle. Furthermore, they point to the fact that they are bearing the brunt of the instability and lawlessness that narcotraffickers have brought to Colombia. In addition, LATAM countries point to the dramatic transformation their economies have experienced. This has been made possible due to expansion of domestic investments, persistence of

stabilization policies, and structural reform which has seen a blossoming of free market economies. Furthermore, they point to the very promising manifestations of current overall regional stability, and the growing strength of democratically elected governments. Their arguments have merit in that these positive changes did not just happen. From their view, these changes are the result of dedicated efforts and much sacrifice. Furthermore, they remind us that achievement of these goals while of benefit to them, also represent fulfillment of important, long standing U.S. regional interests.

It is important to point out that while the reductions in funding are of great concern, the salient issue is not the loss of funding itself. What is of more concern, is that the reductions have been made at a time when all indications clearly show that the war on drugs has not garnered appreciable results and is far from over.

This leads us to two critically important issues that are worthy of consideration: First, these reductions impact on programs that perhaps embody the best way to enhance our counterdrug effort with respect to source nation support . . . empowering U.S. regional allies. Without the continuing development of host nations' government, police, and military capabilities, these entities cannot lend the full measure of expected support that will aid either the U.S. or our allies in reaching counterdrug goals. Much has already been accomplished through the use of security assistance, grant aid, education and

training exercises and service to service exercises. Again it is important to stress that not all of these programs are specifically aimed at the counterdrug issue. However, they indirectly contribute to the enhancement of capabilities and efficiency of our allies. For example, CPX's conducted in Peru using the Light Intensity Conflict simulation "Panther", benefited both the military and national police. This CPX not only stressed warfighting tactics, but also introduced valuable lessons learned by the U.S. military on the importance of civil military and psychological operations. Furthermore, the exercises introduced a keystone to U.S. policy, the requirement for self discipline and observance of human rights. This was followed by extended visits by members from the U.S. Army's Judge Advocates Office, who provided training, guidance, and assistance in developing regulations on the Law of War.

It is difficult to gage the impact that these initiatives have had in assisting the Peruvian Government in stemming the (then) relentless progress of the Sendero Luminoso. However, Gen. Miguel D. Onofre M., former Peruvian Defense Attache to the U.S., has said that these efforts were "instrumental in securing public support for the Peruvian Government's efforts". Furthermore, he credits the programs with "increasing professionalism among the military and national police" which in turn has led to a reduction in human rights abuses.²⁶ These are meaningful gains, but much more work needs to be done.

As already illustrated, overlooking host nation capabilities,

limitations and needs, has been counter-productive to the U.S. effort. Without the critical support of the host nation, U.S. efforts will continue to flounder. The importance of these security assistance/empowering-type programs cannot be overstated. These programs are in place, and are controlled by U.S. agencies. And, when properly coordinated and executed, the dollars spent go to a fruitful cause rather than an obscure coffer, as often happens with other types of economic aid programs. The return on the relatively few dollars invested has the potential of securing much needed, positive returns. As stated by Gen. Barry McCaffrey: "We must reverse this trend [funding cuts] if we wish to remain supportive of Latin American militaries which are professional, support civilian democratic leaders, and are linked to U.S. doctrine."

Secondly, the reductions and their timing give credence to LATAM countries' notion that there is a fundamental lack of understanding of LATAM realities at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. From the U.S. perspective, the reductions are in part, the result of the U.S. Government's reappraisal of its global strategy since the end of the cold war. While this may be fully appropriate and necessary, as viewed by the LATAM governments the results of these reappraisals have been confusing and alarming. Furthermore, while these concerns are not specifically centered on counterdrug operations, the net result has been to thwart U.S. counterdrug efforts. Since the end of the cold war there has been an unsettling notion that LATAM is no

longer important to the U.S. This stems from the consensus that since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. no longer has the need to engage in a turf battle over LATAM.²⁷ The impact as viewed by a Latino, can best be summed-up by the following statement by a LATAM diplomat: "It used to be that we perceived your [U.S.] interests in Latin America as stopping at the Panama Canal; now we believe they stop at Mexico."²⁸

For the U.S. Government's policy and the military's peacetime engagement strategy, this has broad implications. If the military is going to effectively prosecute a campaign of empowering U.S. allies, then those allies must have full confidence that U.S. policy and strategy, does in fact embrace their interests. Simply put, LATAM governments' confidence has eroded because our words do not coincide with tangible commitment, investment, and visible deeds. We must restore the lost confidence. This can best be accomplished by encouraging our allies to participate in establishing regional goals that are symbiotic with the U.S. objectives. The Williamsburg Defense Ministerial Conference, and the Summit of the Americas, held in Miami, are superb vehicles and must be continued with greater frequency.

OVERCOMING THE GAP:

The ambitious objectives (ends) laid out in both the NSS and the NMS are important and we must execute them. However, when the available resources (means) in terms of funding and, force structure are examined, a wide gap clearly emerges. This in turn

affects the concepts and execution of operational efforts (ways). Objectives, resources, and concepts have been described as the three legs of a stool. This stool in turn supports the national military strategy.²⁹ As can be readily seen, in the drug war's case, the stool is unstable and in need of repair. The argument can be made that if you improve the unity of effort (ways), and lay out ironclad concepts (means), you can achieve the objective (ends).

Approaching the problem in a systematic and fundamental manner, perhaps the most effective way to ensure a proper balance would be to narrow the focus of the objectives in terms of time and scope. Of prime importance is to ensure that the U.S. Government clearly understand and regard each of the LATAM allies' capabilities, limitations, concerns, and desired end states. Through interagency coordination and cooperation, we have to then tie the narrower objectives to the available resources for the given period. We must then ensure that limited resources are spent wisely, and are fully supportive of the established objectives. This will require far more interagency coordination and cooperation than presently exists. Lastly, we must ensure that the concepts and operational efforts are linked to measurable and realistic goals. This does not imply that long term goals are to be abandoned; but rather, that more attainable short term goals are used as stepping stones to achieve the ultimate objective.

Of paramount importance is the existence of a truly effective

overarching agency/czardom that is organized and empowered to ensure unity of effort. This agency must assert leadership through tactful coordination, deconfliction, optimizing opportunities in terms of efficiency, and maintaining stewardship over a unified strategy. Undeniably, an overarching agency with sufficient power to direct, coordinate and oversee interagency efforts can ensure the wise use of limited resources. While such an organization already exists in theory, that of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), its value in terms of synchronized effectiveness or authority has to date, been of marginal worth. Perhaps with the recently announced change in stewardship at the ONDCP, a better informed, better led, and more proactive approach will be mounted.³⁰ This is not to suggest that the ONDCP should be empowered to usurp existing federal agencies' command and control of organic assets. Rather, as the entity chartered to set and oversee the nation's drug control policy, the ONDCP must take a far more proactive guiding role. It must ensure that the overarching strategy is symmetrical, synergistic, and executed to a responsible and measurable standard. Another way of looking at it would be to envision the ONDCP as the "honest broker;" i.e. an agency that ensures that other participating agencies' parochialism and protectionism does not hinder the process of accomplishing the mission. Fulfilling a campaign promise, the current administration, set out to reduce the size of government. In part, this encompassed reduction of government agencies' manning. Unfortunately, this

included the ONDCP, which lost over one hundred staff personnel. The administration has come to the realization that the cuts at the ONDCP have been counterproductive, as once again, evidence points to an increase in drug use in the U.S.. Lamentably, once again the victims are this country's future . . . our children (4.2% increase in cocaine use among tenth graders)³¹. The ONDCP may now receive authority to rebuild its staff. If this is the case, staff selection must ensure that key agencies involved in the drug war are well represented. These staffers must be endowed with intimate knowledge of their parent agency's capabilities and capacity, as well as its limitations. As new initiatives are developed, their knowledge of their parent agency's capability will ensure that programs do not overrun capacity and that goals are supportable in terms of manpower, equipment, and funding. More importantly, they will ensure that the coordination process begins immediately which will in turn, enhance much needed interagency cooperation.

CONCLUSION:

The counterdrug problem has been delivering debilitating blows upon the nation. The issue has been properly elevated to national security interest status, and amply addressed in the NSS, NMS, and other related documents. However, the resultant exertions have not thus far met expectations. The reasons for the lack luster results during this campaign are varied. Lack of understanding and sensitivity to allied host nations' reality is a contributing factor. Lack of U.S. interagency coordination and

cooperation is another stumbling block. Reductions of funding for counterdrug and other programs such as nation assistance, security assistance, and military to military contacts have damaged the United States' and allies' efforts. And more importantly, reduced funding and emphasis has damaged the required confidence and credibility amongst the United States' LATAM allies.

In a classical sense, wars are said to be fought for political ends. The policy is the glue that binds and sets the level of effort to be applied in achieving the objectives. The strategy is the path to achieving the end. In the war against drugs, the fabled three legged stool is off kilter and thus of marginal utilitarian use. What is required is not major carpentry work, but rather, fine tuning which brings balance to the struggle in more genuine and measurable bites. Last, but most importantly, there can only be one master carpenter directing a skilled team in this unified effort--a mammoth challenge given the number of artisans committed to the chore.

NOTES

1. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, Feb. 1995, pp 10-11.
2. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C., 1995, pp 9.
3. Donald J. Mabry, "The Latin American Narcotic Trade and U.S. National Security", Greenwood Press, 1989, pp 3.
4. Col. J.L. Bergantz, USA, "Military Support of the National Drug Control Strategy", Military Review, Jun 1992. pp 67-72.
5. National Drug Control Strategy, Budget Summary, The White House, Feb 1995, pp 38-42.
6. Raphael F. Perl, "United States Andean Drug Policy: Background and Issues for Decisionmakers", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Fall 1992), pp 35. Also see LTC R.F. Riccardelli, USA, "Wagging Limited War on Drugs: New Strategy for the Nineties", Military Review, Oct 1994, pp 24-30.
7. CNN, Headline News, Report on a meeting of Finance Ministers from the Organization of American States, 24 Nov 1995.
8. Raphael F. Perl, Also obtained data from slides presented by Prof. William E. Jefferds, on the cost of drugs to the United States, O/A Jan 1992.
9. National Drug Control Policy.
10. Gen. Barry McCaffrey, "Upbeat Outlook For Southern Neighbors", Defense 95, Issue 4, pp 22-35.
11. Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration, NYC Field Office. Data was provided during USAWC New York City trip. While drugs are entering Mexico in bulk volume, it appears that passage into the U.S. occurs in small quantities but at higher frequency. Also see "United States Security Strategy for the Americas", DoD Office of International Security Affairs, Washington D.C., September 1995, pp 14-15, 25-26.
12. United States Security Strategy for the Americas, Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, Wash D.C., Sep 1995, pp 25-26.
13. "United States Special Operations Forces", Posture Statement", 1994, pp 3-6, 19-20.

14. David E. Long, "The Anatomy Of Terrorism", The Free Press, New York N.Y., 1990, pp 81-84. Also see L. Erik Kjonnerod, "Evolving U.S. Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean", National Defense University Press Publications, 1992, pp 9,58,62.

15. Telemundo News Service, Televised daily news report on insurgent attack on Uraú Police Barracks, 27 Dec 1995.

16. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Statistics, "Drugs and Crimes Facts, 1991", Washington D.C., September 1992, pp 18.

17. Notes, Regional Strategic Appraisal, The Americas, Col S. Stringham, Lesson Three, "The Primacy of Economics", Col S. Stringham, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Pa., 26 Jan. 1996.

18. Presentation by Gen Maxwell Thurman, From Strategic Leadership Conference Proceedings, Feb 1991, pp 5-52.

19. Institute For National Strategic Studies, "Strategic Assessment 1995, U.S. Security Challenge in Transition", National Defense University, Wash D.C., 1995, pp 95.

20. Dick Cheney, "DoD and its Role in the War Against Drugs", Defense 89, Nov/Dec 1989, pp 3.

21. Defense Ministerial of the Americas, Williamsburg Va., July 24-26 1996, pp. 19-22.

22. Strategic Assessment 1995, pp. 90.

23. Mr. Benjamin Muskovitz, U.S. State Department, Economic Affairs, Inter American Section. Data was provide during his visit to the U.S. Army War College, 12 Feb 1996.

24. Ibid.

25. McCaffrey, Chart "Declining Security Assistance in Latin America, pp 27. Also see Statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, CINCSOUTH, House National Security Committee, Wash D.C., 8 Mar 1995, pp. 8-9.

26. Gen. Miguel D. Onofre M., Remarks were made during his speech at the School of the Americas', Interamerican Training Conference, Fall 1994, Ft Benning Ga.

27. L. Erik Kjonnerod, "Evolving U.S. Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean", National Defense University Press, Wash. D.C., 1992, Chap 2 by Dr. Howard J. Wiarda, pp 21-42. Also see Gabriel Marcella, "Forging New Strategic Relationships" Military Review, Oct 1994, pp 31-42.

DR. Marcella points out how the uncertainties and reappraisals

being conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces e.g. downsizing, mission and roles, role of NATO and UN, etc. Are understandably having an unsettling effect on our US-Latin American relationships. In sum the "unintended consequences intensify doubts about US intentions...and questions whether the US cares about the future security of the region and the mission of the respective militaries".

28. Ibid, pp 23.

29. Department of National Security and Strategy, "War, National Policy & Strategy", U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Pa., Academic Year 1995, pp. 3, figure 1.

30. President's State of the Union, Jan. 1996, Wash. D.C., President Clinton announced that Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey would be the new "Drug Czar".

31. Peter Jennings. "Report on New Drug Czar and the Administration's Regained Focus on Drug use in U.S.." American Broadcasting Corp. Evening News, 6 March 1996.

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